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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper re-examines the philosophical debate surrounding the issue of moral luck 
through the lens of Freudian psychoanalytic theory. The author argues that Freud's 
writings on moral luck, which have not previously been discussed in this context, 
provide not only a cogent explanation for the reasons behind the existence of moral luck 
but also a compelling argument for the constitutive role played by moral luck in the 
formation of moral agency and moral identity. Freud's own example of a story by Mark 
Twain, "The First Melon I Ever Stole," is explored in this context and compared to other 
more typical examples of moral luck as is another example of moral luck having to do 
with the theft of pears drawn from the writings of St. Augustine. 
  
 
ARTICLE 
 
Moral luck is the strange phenomenon by which twists of fate sometimes work to 
change or amplify our moral judgments of actions taken by ourselves or others. When 
things turn out well, we tend to be lenient towards even grave transgressions. When 
things go wrong, however, and tragedy strikes, guilt and blame may know no bounds 
and may attach themselves to even our smallest mistakes. It is this power of good and 
bad luck to alter and magnify moral blame in cases where the degree of responsibility 
remains a constant that has intrigued and puzzled ethicists in recent years. 
The term "moral luck" was coined by Bernard Williams and given currency in an initial 
exchange with Thomas Nagel on the subject. Although Williams and Nagel differ over 
exactly what conclusions ought to be drawn from occurrences of moral luck, both 
philosophers see the phenomenon as a problem for moral theory generally. The issue is 
how blame or praise can be apportioned when luck is involved and individuals are not 
believed to be primarily responsible for their actions and their outcomes. It seems wrong 
to hold someone accountable for something truly beyond his control, yet once the 
existence of moral luck is acknowledged, it becomes difficult to find areas of life immune 
to the vagaries of fortune such that moral judgment is still possible and appropriate.  
Thus, when moral luck is discussed, it is most often raised as a difficulty for a particular 
ethical theory, or for ethics generally. The particular defenses that have been mounted 
by philosophers in response to the challenge posed by moral luck have been extremely 
diverse, but there is a shared recognition of the problem, and the project has usually 
been to formulate ways in which ethical theories might surmount, or at least 
circumnavigate, the difficulties raised by the occurrence of moral luck. [End Page 445]  
In this paper, I wish to call attention to one theory that explicitly raises the issue of moral 
luck not as a problem but as a support for its own claims regarding ethics and ethical 
theory. This theory is Freudian psychoanalysis. Freudian theory has yet to be mined for 
insights into the issues raised by moral luck, even though Freud is one of the few 
authors to have recognized and addressed the issue directly in his writings. What 
distinguishes Freud's treatment of moral luck from more recent discussions is that he 
approaches it as something other than an interesting stumbling block on the path to an 
otherwise rational and coherent system of normative ethics. For Freud, it is the 
psychological phenomenon of moral luck that is of primary interest, and questions of 
normative ethics arise only as a secondary concern. While this shift in emphasis may 
not initially seem very promising for ethicists, there are substantial insights to be gained 
from Freud's analysis of moral luck both from the standpoint of moral psychology as well 
as from that of normative ethics.  
In the conclusion to his article responding to Bernard Williams, Thomas Nagel writes: 
"The problem of moral luck cannot be understood without an account of the internal 
conception of agency and its special connection with the moral attitudes." He then 
concedes: "I do not have such an account" (1993, 69). If one were to propose a one-line 
definition of psychoanalysis, one could do much worse than describe it as "an account 
of the internal conception of agency and its special connection with the moral attitudes." 
What Freud's analysis offers is an account of why moral luck occurs, its connection with 
the moral sentiments generally, and its role in the production of moral agency and moral 
identity. In short, Freudian theory can provide the link between moral luck and moral 
agency that Nagel notes is lacking. Such a link is necessary if one is to address 
adequately the issues for normative ethics raised by these questions from moral 
psychology, and escape the pitfall of attempting to detach the rational moral agent from 
every unintentional outcome of his or her actions, a project that may simultaneously run 
the risk of destroying the very moral identity of the agent it seeks to explain.  
There are three main points I will argue in this paper. First, Freud's account of moral 
luck differs substantially from any other [End Page 446] discussion of this topic in the 
philosophical literature and, for this reason alone, is worth closer consideration. Second, 
psychoanalysis offers a non-trivial explanation of the reason moral luck occurs without 
having to minimize either its extent or its importance within moral life. Third, Freud's 
analysis illuminates the link between moral luck and moral agency. This is an argument 
with practical implications for normative ethical theories, many of which attempt to 
expunge moral luck entirely. Drawing on Freud's account, I shall argue that moral luck is 
more likely to be a constitutive component of moral character and moral agency than a 
merely contingent one, and that psychoanalysis can provide a cogent explanation of this 
connection between moral luck and moral agency.  
 
Ethics and Its Discontents  
Freud's most detailed and sustained analysis of morality, as well as his most famous 
and influential, can be found in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930). Among the many 
facets of moral life that Freud addresses in this work, there appears the following 
passage:  
The field of ethics, which is so full of problems, presents us with another fact: namely 
that ill-luck - that is, external frustration - so greatly enhances the power of the 
conscience in the superego. As long as things go well with a man, his conscience is 
lenient and lets the ego do all sorts of things; but when misfortune befalls him, he 
searches his soul, acknowledges his sinfulness, heightens the demands of his 
conscience, imposes abstinences on himself and punishes himself with penances. (126) 
Freud here explicitly addresses the phenomenon recently denominated "moral luck" by 
Williams. After beginning with an observation with which most ethicists would 
wholeheartedly agree, namely, that "the field of ethics . . . is so full of problems," he 
then goes on to discuss the "fact" of moral luck.  
It is noteworthy that what Freud takes to be the problem is not how the pangs of guilt 
that so often accompany instances [End Page 447] of (bad) moral luck can be 
reconciled with the demands of a coherent moral theory. Instead, it is the phenomenon 
itself that interests him. That is, what Freud believes to be in need of explanation is why 
feelings of guilt arise in the first place, not whether or not these feelings are morally 
justified. Freud takes the existence of moral luck as a given, and from this starting point 
he deduces some interesting conclusions about the nature of morality. This is the exact 
opposite of the way many ethicists have proceeded. Often an ethical theory of one 
stripe or another is assumed (either explicitly or implicitly), and from this starting point 
conclusions are drawn about the nature of moral luck. This difference in approach is 
striking and significant for the kinds of conclusions one is able to draw from cases 
involving moral luck.  
The specific kind of "ill-luck" Freud considers is that arising from "external frustration" or, 
as it is more often named in the current debates, "extrinsic luck" (Williams 1993a, 41). 
Extrinsic luck concerns factors outside of the agent's control that affect the outcome of 
his projects, such as natural disasters, accidents of all types, and other unforeseeable 
events. This is opposed to "intrinsic" moral luck, which deals with factors beyond the 
agent's control but that nonetheless contribute to the agent's character and abilities. 
These include such things as inclinations and talents. As Daniel Statman (1993, 27) has 
noted, there are gray areas where it is difficult to distinguish extrinsic from intrinsic 
factors. For instance, are accidents of birth that affect the character of an individual 
cases of extrinsic or intrinsic luck? In an effort to clarify these points, Nagel (1993) 
further subdivides these categories into the four cases: constitutive, circumstantial, 
causal, and resultant luck. Constitutive luck includes a person's "inclinations, capacities, 
and temperament," circumstantial luck concerns "the kind of problems and situations 
one faces," whereas causal and resultant luck refer to those factors beyond the agent's 
control that affect either what actions are taken or the outcome of those actions (60). 
Martha Nussbaum (1986) and Claudia Card (1996) have each explored issues 
surrounding constitutive and circumstantial moral luck in their works. However, most 
discussions have centered on cases involving causal and resultant luck. [End Page 
448]  
Freud's discussion of "external frustration" also fits most easily under the heading of 
resultant luck: the way our actions and plans actually turn out, as opposed to the way 
we intend them to turn out. This is the kind of luck Kant considers as well in the famous 
opening passages from the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), where he 
writes of the jewel-like quality of a good will apart from any results it may achieve in the 
world. This locus classicus in Kant is the starting point for Nagel's reflections on moral 
luck. In general, cases of resultant luck tend to be the clearest and least ambiguous 
examples in the literature on moral luck.  
Williams's own example (1993a) of a truck driver who, through no fault of his own, runs 
over a child can be taken as an illustration of an external frustration that leads to bad 
results. In this case, the driver's intentions are only to get from here to there, and his 
actions are consistent with this goal, yet despite his lack of malice, and absent even any 
negligence on his part, his actions bring about the tragic death of a child. Here the 
external event of a child running in front of the truck drastically alters the outcome of the 
driver's actions. Nagel (1993, 61) argues that this is simply a case of plain old bad luck 
and not yet a case of specifically bad moral luck. This is so because the driver is entirely 
without fault and thus has no reason to reproach himself. The driver may in fact feel 
badly, but he bears no moral blame for the death. For Nagel, it would only be a case of 
bad moral luck if the driver had been in some way negligent, even to a small degree. If 
this were true, then the driver would reproach himself much more harshly for this 
negligence in the case where a child had been killed than in the case where the drive 
had been uneventful. The actions would be the same, but the feelings about those 
actions would be incommensurable. The reason for this different, and harsher, 
evaluation of his actions would be due to bad moral luck, that is, the chance event that a 
child had darted into the road.  
Williams, however, points out, contra Nagel, that such an analysis presupposes a great 
deal: "what is the point of insisting that a certain reaction or attitude is or is not a moral 
one? What is it that this category is supposed to deliver? . . . I still cannot see what 
comfort it is supposed to give me, or what instruction it offers to other people, if I am 
shunned, hated, unloved, and [End Page 449] despised, not least by myself, but am 
told that these reactions are at any rate not moral" (1993b, 254). The fact that a truck 
driver is likely to feel guilt and reproach himself for the death of the child even if he was 
not negligent in the least is something that needs explanation. To say that this instance 
of guilt is not moral, but that the same feelings in different circumstances would be 
moral, simply begs the question. Why are people prone to such feelings to begin with? If 
they are unwarranted, then why do they occur? It is here that Freud's analysis of moral 
luck can shed some needed light.  
 
The Anatomy of Guilt  
Freud's analysis begins with the guilt generated by situations of bad moral luck, like that 
of the truck driver, and works from there to uncover the source of those feelings. Briefly, 
the explanation he puts forward is the following:  
Fate is regarded as a substitute for the parental agency. If a man is unfortunate it 
means that he is no longer loved by this highest power; and, threatened by such loss of 
love, he once more bows to the parental representative in his superego - a 
representative whom, in his days of good fortune, he was ready to neglect. (1930, 126-
27) 
For Freud, situations involving bad luck simply provide the superego with opportunities 
to vent its pent-up aggression on the ego. The superego is in a position of practical 
omniscience with regard to the agent's actions and desires, and so knows of his many 
forbidden wishes and repressed desires. Bad luck is construed as a punishment and as 
a sign of disapproval and loss of the parents' love. This situation results in feelings of 
guilt out of proportion with either the offense or the agent's degree of responsibility. This 
is only to be expected since, for Freud, the guilt is not over the event, it is over all those 
other things for which one ought to have been punished but escaped. Ultimately, it is 
over fear of the loss of love by one's parents for all the unworthy things one has done or 
imagined. Happenings in the world for which one is not responsible can, legitimately, 
[End Page 450] be a matter of indifference. But disapproval by one's parents, 
regardless of the reasons, is inherently something of enormous concern, capable of 
inciting strong emotions. In the case of bad moral luck, events in the world become 
linked with that fear of being unloved in a direct and powerful way. The bad luck 
becomes a sign of that loss of love; it becomes itself the punishment for one's 
transgressions, and the resulting guilt becomes all too easy to explain.  
Now, the particular instance of the ill-luck of the driver killing the child may not initially 
seem to be a very good example of the kind of ill-luck Freud is discussing. After all, it is 
the child who has the worst luck, not the driver. In what way is the death of the child to 
be construed as punishment by Fate directed at the driver? Better examples would 
perhaps be ones where the misfortune befalls the agent and not some third party. There 
is no insurmountable difficulty in using the truck driver example even here, however. All 
that needs to be present is a tragic event for which the agent bears no real moral 
responsibility and yet over which he suffers real guilt. The truck driver incident could 
very well fulfill these requirements, and we can easily imagine such a driver reproaching 
himself with harsh recriminations, swearing never to drive again, and suffering severely 
from guilt and pangs of conscience.  
Different drivers, of course, may respond differently to such tragedies. Feelings of guilt 
are not something that can be predicted simply from the events themselves. For 
psychoanalysis, certainly, the relations between events in the external world and events 
inside the psyche are never simple or straightforward. However, the fact that individual 
experiences of guilt may vary widely even when their moral culpability remains the 
same once again suggests that something other than moral judgment may lie behind 
these feelings. The response described here, of self-reproach and guilt, may sound 
extreme (and may in fact be extreme), but it certainly falls within the range of 
recognizable human reactions to such a tragedy. The peculiarity that such responses 
are not morally warranted by the situation is precisely what stands in need of 
explanation. However, there are ways to strengthen this example still further.  
Consider what happens if we assume that the child killed in the accident was the truck 
driver's own. This reverse oedipal [End Page 451] twist creates more interest for the 
psychoanalyst. That the driver might feel overwhelming guilt, and that the source of 
those feelings might be sought in the unconscious death wishes that haunt even the 
most loving parent-child relationship, would not be hard to infer. In this case, though, the 
moral responsibility remains exactly the same and so would not alter any of the 
discussions above, but the guilt generated by the incident would be multiplied many 
times over. All that has been changed is that a case of bad moral luck has been 
transformed into one of very bad moral luck.  
The point in fabricating this example is simply to demonstrate that moral responsibility 
does not provide an exhaustive explanation for feelings of guilt. In accidentally killing 
one's own child, the presence of guilt and the suffering this would entail are readily 
apparent. It is also perhaps easier to see how the agent might construe the incident as 
a punishment directed at himself for his own faults and shortcomings and reproach 
himself accordingly. It is interesting that none of the examples in the literature on moral 
luck has been elaborated in this way. It is typically assumed that the reason one feels 
guilty is for moral reasons, and the hunt is then on for various permutations to change 
the level of moral responsibility involved. But why assume this? All we know for sure is 
that in these kinds of situations people often do feel guilt. Why not elaborate them in 
such a way so as to increase the feelings of guilt? From this we might more readily see 
what there is about the situation that incites these feelings and what is really operating 
at the root of instances of so-called moral luck. Williams was right to note that it is not 
comforting to tell a person that some feelings of guilt are not moral while otherwise 
identical feelings in slightly different circumstances are moral. What this highlights is 
simply that morality and guilt have a less straightforward relationship than many 
ethicists would like to admit, a state of affairs that psychoanalysis has no trouble 
accommodating.  
In a footnote immediately following the passage from Civilization and Its Discontents 
where Freud first broaches the subject of moral luck, he discusses just such an example 
where the level of moral culpability remains constant, yet the level of guilt rises 
dramatically: [End Page 452]  
This enhancing of morality as a consequence of ill-luck has been illustrated by Mark 
Twain in a delightful little story, The First Melon I Ever Stole. This first melon happened 
to be unripe. I heard Mark Twain tell the story himself in one of his public readings. After 
he had given out the title, he stopped and asked himself as though he was in doubt: 
"Was it the first?" With this, everything had been said.1 (126) 
The doubt introduced by Twain when he asks whether it was really the first melon he 
ever stole underscores that it is only the fact that things went wrong that made this theft 
memorable and an occasion for self-reproach. All the other ripe, sweet, and juicy 
melons he had previously stolen were erased from memory. However, Twain's newly 
awakened conscience does not trouble him overmuch. Instead of feeling guilt over his 
theft or seeking to provide restitution, Twain becomes angry with the unscrupulous 
farmer who was trying to sell that sour melon to an unsuspecting customer.  
For Freud, Twain's satirical morality tale highlights that pangs of conscience are often 
felt most strongly when things go wrong. Although the theft of an unripe melon 
occasions only a cursory reflection on the propriety of stealing, the sour taste 
nonetheless serves as a proxy for the absent parental chastisement. The oedipal 
sources of Twain's youthful guilt and need for punishment are not difficult to spot. In this 
connection, one might recall all the other masochistic boys in Twain's semi-
autobiographical fiction, such as Tom Sawyer, who habitually misbehave to gain the 
attention they crave from the ones they love, even if that attention brings with it a 
beating (Avalos 2005, 50-52).  
According to Freud, what induces guilt, illness, and neurosis is a frustration of one sort 
or another. In Twain's story, the frustration is an external one in the form of the sour 
melon itself. However, in a dialectical twist, Freud (1916) also explores cases where 
individuals are "wrecked by success" and fall ill when their dreams come true and their 
repressed wishes are fulfilled. Freud resolves this apparent contradiction by noting that 
the unconscious is happy to spare the individual the internal sufferings of guilt so long 
as there is sufficient suffering imposed [End Page 453] externally through being 
deprived of his wish. Once the wish is granted, though, the internal sense of guilt may 
be unleashed by the superego as a compensating punishment directed at the always 
unworthy ego. Thus, the punishment is constant and unrelenting. Either one is deprived 
of what he truly desires or one is punished by feelings of guilt if he should succeed in 
attaining his goal. In either case, there will be suffering.  
However, it remains true that stealing a melon, finding it delicious, and suffering no bad 
consequences seems far less likely to give rise to guilt than when the stolen fruit is 
defective in some way. The pleasure from the ill-gotten gain may even tend to 
counteract and overshadow any pangs of guilt that do manage to slip in. Consider in 
this connection the case of St. Augustine and his famous theft of the pears. In Book 2 of 
the Confessions, Augustine laments an occasion in his adolescence when he and some 
of his friends stole pears out of a neighbor's tree. They did not need the pears and did 
not even really want them, eventually throwing most of their booty to the pigs. For 
Augustine, it is the pointlessness of his theft that makes it an act of evil. Judging from 
his later writings, the guilt over this episode stayed with him his whole life. However, the 
suspicion arises that the power and longevity of his guilt could not have been due 
simply to the theft of worthless pears. During puberty, Augustine had been sternly 
warned by his mother against adultery. As Peter Rudnytsky observes: "The 
disproportion between the triviality of Augustine's offense and the extreme importance 
he imputes to it may thus be explained psychoanalytically as a displacement of the 
sense of guilt properly attaching to the former events [his mother's warnings] onto the 
latter [his theft of the pears]" (1994, 140).2  
Thus, the source of the guilt may not lie in the obvious transgression. Instead, the theft 
becomes the occasion for inflicting already existing oedipal guilt onto the unsuspecting 
ego. Freud writes: "Paradoxical as it may sound, I must maintain that the sense of guilt 
was present before the misdeed, that it did not arise from it, but conversely - the 
misdeed arose from the sense of guilt. These people might justly be described as 
criminals from a sense of guilt" (1916, 332). That is, the theft may have been caused by 
pre-existing feelings of guilt and used as an outlet for those feelings, rather than being 
itself the cause of the guilt. [End Page 454]  
Augustine also notes, however, that the pears he stole in his youth and over which he 
suffered such guilt were "attractive in neither color nor taste" (1991, 28?29). Here we 
may find a small opening for moral luck to intrude into the story. Had the pears been 
sweeter, one wonders whether Augustine's conscience would have been more lenient. 
Like Twain after him, it may have been the bad luck of a particular outcome, the stealing 
of such unappealing fruit, that occasioned his reflections on morality and opened the 
floodgates of his guilt. Had the theft served any useful function, it might have been 
possible to justify it, or at least to enjoy it. If these speculations are correct at all, the real 
reason for the unlikely theft was to provide an opportunity for self-punishment. Unlike 
Twain, who vents his newfound moral outrage on the turpitude of the farmer who was 
trying to sell the green melon, Augustine reserves his opprobrium for himself.  
The stories of Twain and Augustine both make interesting examples of cases of moral 
luck, in many ways better than the more frequently used examples. They do so because 
they highlight the agent-specific nature of moral luck. To a third party, it makes very little 
difference whether the melon or the pear was sweet or not in judging the morality of the 
action. Stealing fruit is simply wrong. But to the agent, and for the agent's feelings 
towards those actions, the taste of the fruit might be extremely relevant. It is only the 
intervention of an external event, the bad luck of stealing an unripe piece of fruit, that 
introduces a perceived punishment. What Freud is able to explain is why instances of 
bad moral luck can exacerbate feelings of guilt. What is at work is not morality. What is 
at work is the unconscious. These stories are the flip side of cases that are more 
typically considered in discussions of moral luck, such as the truck driver story. Instead 
of a person with no responsibility who suffers pangs of guilt when misfortune occurs, in 
these instances a person who bears full moral responsibility feels guilt, or feels it more 
intensely, when bad luck intervenes. Freud's account is able to explain both sorts of 
cases.  
The second case may not seem to merit attention because it does not directly cast 
doubt on ethical theory as such, but only on the agent's own morals. The usual view is 
that a person ought to feel guilt over theft, and the lack of such feelings is taken to show 
a lack of moral character, not to provide evidence that in [End Page 455] some 
instances stealing is morally acceptable. For this reason, such cases are usually of little 
interest to ethicists. However, they do need to be considered if one wants to explain the 
origin of guilt, not to justify a particular ethical theory. If guilt both occurs and fails to 
occur when an agent both is and is not responsible, then it may be that guilt and 
morality have a very different connection from the one that is often supposed. If cases 
of the first type throw suspicion on the adequacy of ethical theory, as both Williams and 
Nagel have argued, then perhaps cases of the second type should be examined as 
well. Freud's account of moral luck has the merit of taking seriously both sorts of 
situations and not artificially truncating his range of examples. It now remains to be seen 
what difference such an account of moral luck might make for ethical theory generally.  
 
Character, Culture, and Moral Agency  
Despite their other differences, Williams and Nagel agree that moral luck influences our 
conception of what it means to be a moral agent. Nagel writes:  
it is not enough to say merely that our basic moral attitudes toward ourselves and others 
are determined by what is actual; for they are also threatened by the sources of that 
actuality, and by the external view of action which forces itself on us when we see how 
everything we do belongs to a world that we have not created. (1993, 69) 
Here, Nagel concludes that moral luck must play a role in any adequate account of 
moral agency since such luck is endemic to every moral undertaking. Williams makes a 
similar point, arguing further that conceptions of moral agency that do not take account 
of moral luck and that attempt to exclude and eliminate all traces of the accidental and 
unintentional will do fatal damage to their own conceptions of moral agency.  
In discussing the appropriateness of feelings of guilt in an instance where the agent 
bears no moral responsibility for an unfortunate outcome affecting another person, 
Williams writes: [End Page 456]  
it would be a kind of insanity never to experience sentiments of this kind towards 
anyone, and it would be an insane concept of rationality which insisted that a rational 
person never would. To insist on such a conception of rationality, moreover, would, 
apart from other kinds of absurdity, suggest a large falsehood: that we might, if we 
conducted ourselves clear-headedly enough, entirely detach ourselves from the 
unintentional aspects of our actions . . . and yet still retain our identity and character as 
agents. (1993a, 44) 
It is this identity of the moral agent that is at stake in the issue of moral luck. The 
question becomes how constitutive experiences of moral luck are to the moral character 
of the agent, and whether or not the experiences of guilt over situations involving bad 
moral luck can be eliminated without fundamentally altering the identity of that moral 
agent.  
Consider the truck driver example again. Could a driver who suffered no guilt over the 
accidental death of a child ever be the moral equivalent of one who did display such 
guilt? Is the presence or absence of feelings of guilt truly negligible to our account of the 
moral character of the agent? One could plausibly argue that feelings of guilt under 
such circumstances are so normal and unexceptional that the complete lack of such 
feelings would be sufficient grounds to doubt the moral character of any agent who did 
not possess them. It is at least difficult to see how the argument could be made that 
feelings of guilt not only are not required but are, in fact, completely irrelevant to the 
moral identity of the agent. To claim that an agent should not feel guilt in this situation, 
or that these feelings are morally irrelevant, or even supererogatory, is to come close to 
the "insane concept of rationality" against which Williams warns. It entails an almost 
inhuman level of detachment "from the unintentional aspects of our actions." In this 
light, the feelings of guilt experienced by the driver, no matter how seemingly irrational, 
are unlikely to be superfluous to his moral identity, and are more likely to be an 
important constitutive part of that identity. In the case of Augustine, we have an agent 
who feels what many would regard as a morally appropriate guilt over his theft, but 
taken to an extreme degree. However, this [End Page 457] excessive guilt over an 
otherwise minor transgression is clearly formative of Augustine's character. A St. 
Augustine who did not feel such guilt, for so long, or with such intensity would not be the 
same imposing figure we all know. He would be a substantially different moral agent 
with a substantially different identity. Drawing on Freud's analysis of Twain's anecdote, I 
argued above that it was possible that a similar "enhancing of morality as a 
consequence of ill-luck" may also have taken place with regard to Augustine's stealing 
of the unappealing pears. If such an accident could have exacerbated the guilt over the 
event, even to a small degree, then we have the possibility that increased guilt due to 
bad moral luck might be something that helps to create the moral character of the 
agent. In that case, moral luck would play a role in constituting exactly what is 
extraordinary about the moral character of St. Augustine.  
A similar argument could be made about the extraordinary character met with in the 
satirical self-portrait by Mark Twain. It is the awakening of an otherwise dormant 
conscience by the bad luck of an unripe melon that constitutes what is unique, and 
uniquely funny, about this otherwise amoral agent. For Twain, this instance of bad moral 
luck may be constitutive of a curmudgeon rather than a saint, but it is still fundamental 
to the moral character and identity of that agent. To eliminate the role of moral luck in 
this example would transform the identity of the agent from a hapless moral bungler to a 
much less interesting cold-blooded sociopath who simply never feels guilt over his 
thefts, even those that go awry.  
If what is remarkable about Augustine is his excess of guilt, then what is remarkable 
about Twain is his deficiency of guilt except under adverse conditions. In either case, it 
can be argued that even the small amount of bad moral luck present in these examples 
works to help constitute the moral identities of these otherwise very different agents. In 
the truck driver example, too, it seems implausible to argue that a driver who does not 
experience guilt over the death of the child is the moral equivalent of a driver who does 
experience such guilt. In each of these situations, the guilt generated by bad moral luck 
is not clearly ancillary to the moral identity of the agent but seems more likely to be 
constitutive of that identity. To attempt to expunge all traces of moral luck from these 
examples would be to erase [End Page 458] much of the moral character of each of 
these agents. It certainly would not leave the moral identities untouched.  
Given these examples, it seems justified to conclude along with Williams and Nagel that 
moral luck plays an important and constitutive role in the formation of moral character 
and identity. In each of the situations discussed above, morality is enhanced by an 
element of moral luck in such a way that the very character of the moral agent becomes 
bound up with his reactions to these external frustrations. This is precisely the point 
being asserted by both Williams and Nagel in their initial exchange on the topic of moral 
luck.  
What is new here is that psychoanalytic theory can supply a reason for this entangling 
of luck and morality, something that few other theories have been able to offer. For 
Freud, this connection between luck and morality comes about because morality itself 
arises out of the sublimation of human aggression, an aggression that always requires 
new outlets even if it means the agent himself or herself must become the target for his 
or her own aggression. In this way, unfortunate accidents are seized upon as occasions 
to justify the venting of pent-up aggression on oneself in the form of guilt. These 
reproaches do not seem justified on any clear moral grounds, yet they occur and recur 
with monotonous regularity. The incorporation of moral luck as a predictable and normal 
event to which all moral agents are prone is one of the principal advantages 
psychoanalysis has to recommend itself in this philosophical debate. That it also gives 
rise to other problems within ethical theory does not obviate this benefit. Thus, Freud 
can account for the constitutive nature of moral luck in the moral identities of Augustine, 
Twain, and the truck driver without permitting it to violate any requirements concerning 
the rationality necessary for moral agency. In fact, far from violating the prerequisites for 
moral agency, psychoanalysis lends credence to the view that moral luck is itself one of 
the mechanisms through which moral agency and identity are produced.  
In his conclusion to Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), Freud notes that the ethical 
demands made by society on the individual seem to have little regard for "whether it is 
possible for people to obey" them (143). For Freud, unlike Kant, "ought" in no way 
implies "can." It is this imbalance between the ethical [End Page 459] demands and 
psychological realities faced by individuals that leads Freud to his less than optimistic 
conclusions about the "discontents" inherent in human life. It may be that instances of 
moral luck are best understood as yet another place where ethics makes demands that 
individuals cannot carry out. The injunction to dissociate oneself from the unintentional 
aspects of one's actions does not imply that can be done. Here the problem is not 
simply that the demand is very difficult, but that it may be impossible to fulfill and still 
retain one's moral identity. Highlighting this conflict and giving one possible explanation 
of its origin is one of the most valuable insights psychoanalysis has to offer ethicists. A 
perfectly rational and coherent system of ethics may be unattainable for the less than 
perfectly rational and coherent agents that are human beings. Viewed in this way, moral 
life may not be purely rational, but neither is it inexplicable.  
 
Notes  
1. Two versions of this speech by Twain have been collected and published under the 
title "Morals Lecture" (1968; 1976).  
2. In a further twist, Rudnytsky argues that the warnings of Augustine's mother against 
adultery are themselves a displacement of the unconscious incestuous dynamics in 
their relationship.  
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